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E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/03/2019

TAGS: [KACT](#) [MARR](#) [PARM](#) [PREL](#) [RS](#) [US](#) [START](#)

SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VI):
(U) CONVERSION OR ELIMINATION WORKING GROUP CHAIRMENS'
COFFEE, OCTOBER 22, 2009

REF: STATE 99070-(SFO-V-GUIDANCE-003A) AND STATE
99072-(SFO-V-GUIDANCE-003B)

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).

1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VI-014.

2. (U) Meeting Date: October 22, 2009
Time: 3:30 - 6:00 P.M.
Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva
Participants:

U.S.	RUSSIA
Mr. Elliott	Col Ryzhkov
Lt Col Goodman	Mr. Smirnov
Mr. Hopkins (Int)	Ms. Komshiliova (Int)

SUMMARY

3. (S) The U.S. Chairman of the Conversion or Elimination (CorE) Working Group (WG), Mr. Elliott, hosted his Russian counterpart, Colonel Ryzhkov, for coffee on October 22, 2009 at the U.S. Mission, to discuss the U.S.-proposed CorE protocol delivered to the Russian side that morning. Elliott first reviewed the layout of the document and said that many sections were close to being agreed. Elliott and Ryzhkov clarified U.S. and Russian positions in those areas where

there was no agreement. Finally, the Chairmen agreed on the schedule of work for the October 23 meeting and the following week.

¶4. (S) Relations between the two Chairmen were very cordial and they discussed the issues frankly. Many positions held by the Russian side were discussed in a more open manner than they had been with the entire delegation present. Although this meeting was intended only to discuss the way ahead, it served to broach many important issues and set the stage for negotiations within the WG structure.

¶5. (U) SUBJECT SUMMARY: The U.S.-proposed Core Protocol; and, After the Closing.

THE U.S.-PROPOSED CORE PROTOCOL

¶6. (S) Elliott began the meeting by presenting the overall structure of the U.S. proposal for the Core Protocol. He then proceeded, section-by-section, to explain where the U.S. proposal differed from the U.S. official Core protocol delivered to the Russian Federation on September 24, 2009 (REFTEL).

¶7. (S) Elliott began with Section I "Elimination of ICBMs and SLBMs." Ryzhkov laughed and showed Elliott his document (in Russian) with the same heading for Section I. Ryzhkov stated that in many of the sections both sides have the same language and it will be very easy to agree. Elliott continued, stating that Section I now contained three

subsections: 1) Procedures for Elimination of ICBMs, 2) Procedures for Elimination of ICBMs for Mobile Launchers and 3) Procedures for Elimination of SLBMs. The ICBM and SLBM elimination sections were pulled from the U.S.-proposed treaty text (Article VII). Elliott explained the differences in the U.S.-proposed elimination of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs by highlighting the simplified procedures and the facts that, under the revised U.S. approach, the self-contained dispensing mechanism (SCDM) was no longer eliminated and that inspectors would not observe the entire elimination process but rather the final elimination of all missile stages. Ryzhkov listened intently taking copious notes.

¶8. (S) Elliott continued with Section II "Launchers for silo launchers of ICBMs." Ryzhkov politely interrupted Elliott and, again laughing, showed his document (in Russian) with highlighted text for Section II. He explained that the highlighted language is where the Russian side had adopted the U.S.-proposed language. Ryzhkov stated that the Russian side felt this section was "almost ready" and the sides had common ground in this area. Ryzhkov stated he would like to comment on Section I. The Russian proposal also contained three subsections: 1) Procedures for Elimination of Liquid Fueled ICBMs, 2) Procedures for Elimination of Liquid Fueled SLBMs and 3) Procedures for Elimination of Solid Fueled ICBMs and SLBMs. He said the elimination process for solid missiles is: 1) burning of all stages, 2) cut first stage motor case into two parts, and 3) other procedures (U.S.-proposed wild card option).

¶9. (S) Ryzhkov continued the discussion by outlining the structure for each section. Each section follows the same construct with four steps:

- Notification of intent to eliminate. This notification must contain the procedures the eliminating Party intends to use. The Party receiving such notification can agree or disagree with the procedures. If the Party agrees, the elimination proceeds as scheduled. If the Party does not agree, the elimination is halted and the issue will be discussed in the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC). It is the burden of the eliminating Party to present/demonstrate the procedures at the BCC to convince the

other Party that the procedures render the strategic offensive arm (SOA) inoperative and preclude it for use for its original purpose.

- Following notification, the procedures are completed.

- Notification of completion of elimination is sent.

- Within 30 days, the other Party has a right to inspect to confirm the procedures were accomplished.

¶10. (S) Elliott asked what happened if the two sides do not agree in the BCC. Ryzhkov responded that he was confident the sides would agree and that it was the burden of the Party conducting the elimination to convince the other Party that the procedures meet the two basic requirements (render the SOA inoperative and preclude it for use for its original purpose). Ryzhkov further stated that the strategic relationship between the United States and Russia was such

that the disagreements of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC) would not occur under the BCC. Elliott then inquired about the timing of the BCC. He stated that the BCC would only meet twice per year and if the sides did not agree there could be significant time before it could be resolved, thus effectively blocking the elimination process. Ryzhkov responded that special sessions could be called but, again, he was confident the sides would agree. Ryzhkov stated the Russian side intended to provide monthly notifications of the elimination schedule.

¶11. (S) Elliott continued the discussion by proceeding to Section III, "Elimination of Launchers for Mobile Launchers of ICBMs." He highlighted the differences in the U.S.-proposed elimination procedure by highlighting the simplified procedures and stated that inspectors would not observe the entire elimination process but rather the final elimination steps. Ryzhkov again listened intently and took copious notes. Moving on to Section IV, "Conversion and Elimination of SLBM Launchers," Elliott stated that the Core of SBLM launchers had been separated into two sections. Simplified procedures are introduced as well as removing the time limit for elimination of 270 days. Elliott continued by stating that the substance in this section is very similar to the Russian side. Ryzhkov agreed and stated that, for elimination of SLBM launchers, the Russian side saw a key procedure of removing the launch tube hatches as mandatory. There would then be other procedures applied to the launcher to render them inoperable as decided by the possessing Party. Elliott noted that the U.S. side would probably not use the SLBM elimination procedures during this treaty. Ryzhkov answered that the Russian side would use the elimination procedures. For conversion, Ryzhkov indicated his view that the key procedure for an SLBM launcher would be to modify the height of diameter of the launch tube and other procedures applied to the launcher to render them incapable for their original purpose, as determined by the possessing Party. Elliott noted that the U.S. side may elect to use the conversion procedures and were, therefore, looking at them very closely. Ryzhkov nodded, but did not say whether the Russian side would or would not utilize the conversion procedures. Elliott stated that the U.S. side understood that a Party may convert an individual SLBM launch tube or a whole submarine. Ryzhkov said that was okay and the Russian side agreed. Elliott again noted, under the U.S. concept, that it would be permissible under the treaty to convert from one type of SOA to another type of SOA (i.e., remaining nuclear) but that procedures for such a conversion were not required in the Core Protocol.

¶12. (S) Elliott began his explanation of Section IV, "Conversion or Elimination of Heavy Bombers," and again Ryzhkov politely interrupted Elliott to say the Russian side had not accepted the U.S. proposal in this section. To which Elliott nodded. Ryzhkov further stated that the Russian side had accepted the U.S. proposal in Section V, "Other Procedures for Removal from Accountability," and said the

Russian side's position was very close on Section VI, "Elimination of Facilities." Ryzhkov read the Russian section on elimination of facilities. "A facility shall be considered eliminated when all SOA declared for the facility including Training Models of Missiles (TMOMs), fixed structures, support vehicles, driver training vehicles have

been removed or eliminated," with notification in accordance with (IAW) the appropriate section and an inspection visit if the Party so desired.

AFTER THE CLOSING

¶13. (S) While Mr. Smirnov excused himself to smoke, Ryzhkov asked Elliott to explain the heavy bomber counting rules the U.S. side had presented in the plenary meeting. Elliott explained it was his understanding that Russian ALCMs are stored without their warheads while the U.S. ALCMs are stored as units with their warheads. Elliott noted that the warhead could not get to a target without the associated cruise missile and that the United States would therefore agree to count the Russian cruise missiles only; which was essentially considering the ALCMs to contain a warhead. Ryzhkov agreed that Elliott had correctly described the Russian storage procedure, but reiterated that the Russian side did not have bombers uploaded with weapons and, therefore, there were no deployed warheads. Elliott agreed, but went on to say that neither did the United States have weapons loaded on bombers or sitting alert and that this was the point. It would not be logical to say that the sides had no warheads for their nuclear bombers. Ryzhkov indicated the Russian side believed there was a flaw in the U.S. logic in that while only warheads mated on ICBMs and SLBMs counted, we sought to count ALCMs not loaded on heavy bombers. Elliott said he understood this view, but that the U.S. side, due to the nature of bombers and their inherent ability to be loaded in a relatively short period of time, felt it very important to have some level of accounting for these weapons. He also stated that both sides would look silly in their respective capitals if they ignored the bomber counting issue. Ryzhkov said he better understood and would study the possibility of a distance or time restriction for the storage of ALCMs from a heavy bomber base.

¶14. (U) Documents exchanged. None.

¶15. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS